Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1991

Paul Franklin Farr, Merridee Farr v. Bryce Willis
Royle, Pamela Royle, Dan Ziehm, Tom Haycock,
D/B/A Fireside Real Estate : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Paul Franklin Farr; Paul Franklin Farr & Associates; Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Alan R. Stewart; Poole & Voros; Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Paul Franklin Farr, Merridee Farr v. Bryce Willis Royle, Pamela Royle, Dan Ziehm, Tom Haycock, D/B/A Fireside Real
Estate, No. 910548.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3749

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BRIfcf
UTAH
DOCl .;-i<4T
KFU
50
DOCKET NO.

g(

r-ne?i¥k-C£__
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

PAUL FRANKLIN FARR, and
MERRIDEE FARR,

Trial Court
No. 10799

Plaintiff-Appellants,
Appellate Court
No.
v.
BRYCE WILLIS ROYLE, PAMELA
ROYLE, Defendants-Appellees, DAN
ZIEHM, AND TOM HAYCOCK, D/B/A,
FIRESIDE REAL ESTATE,

91-0548-CA

Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
On Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, Honorable Frank G. Noel
Paul Franklin Farr (#1040)
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
BUSCH FORUM
Suite 540
5295 South 320 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-4711
Telephone: (801) 263-5555
Alan R. Stewart
POOLE & VOROS, P. C. ia I L, fcz hJ
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents
4885 South 900 East
oc D i 7 1001
Suite 306
*tv ] ' 1VV1
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

IN Tl?r

TTTAH

PAUL FRANKLIN FARR, and
MERRIDEE FARR,

SUPREME COURT

.rial Court
10799

Plaintiff-Appellants,
\ppellate Court
Mo. 910126
v.
BRYCE WILLIS ROYLE, PAMELA
ROYLE, Defendants-Appellees, DAN
ZIEHM, AND TOM HAYCOCK, D/B/A,
FIRESIDE REAL ESTATE,
Defendants.

Ul'll I

Or- I'I A l h l l H S Al'i'l i L A M S

Appeal from the Third Judicial District court in ana ior Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, Honorable Frank G. Noel

Paul Franklin Farr (#1040)
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
BUSCH FORUM
Suite 540
5295 South 320 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-4711
Telephone: (801) 263-5555
Alan R. Stewart
POOLE & VOROS, P. C.
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents
4885 South 900 East
Suite 306
Salt Lake City, UT 84117

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

BRIEF STATEMENT RE APPELLATE JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

7

ARGUMENT
I.
UTAH LAW REGARDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE

8

II.

8

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT PROPER BECAUSE
DISCOVERY IS NOT COMPLETED

12

III.

UTAH LAW REGARDING

MUTUAL MISTAKE

13

IV.

UTAH LAW REGARDING
AMBIGUOUS

CONTRACT NOT INTEGRATED OR

UTAH LAW REGARDING
PROVISION

WAIVER OF CONTRACT

UTAH LAW REGARDING

AMENDMENTS TO CONTRACTS

V.
VI.

14
15

CONCLUSION

..

16
17

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Allen v. Kingdon. 723 P. 2d 394 (Utah 1986)

3, 16

Bullough v. Sims. 400 P.2d 20 (Utah 1965)

2, 15

Callioux v. Progressive Insurance Co.. 745 P.2d 838, 840 (Ut.Ct.App. 1987) . . . 2, 12, 13
Draughton v. CUNA Mutual Insurance Society. 771 P.2d 1105 (Utah App. 1989) . 2, 14
Ehlers & Ehlers Architects, v. Carbon County. 805 P.2d 789 (Ct. of App. 1991) . . 1,11
Ferris v. Jennings. 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979)
First American Commerce v. Washington. 743 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1987)
Gadd v.Olson. 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah, 1984)

10
1,11
1, 9, 11

Johnson v. E.V. Cox Const. Co.. 620 P.2d 917, (Okla. App. 1980)

3, 15

Moonev v. GR & Associates. 746 P.2d 1174 (Ut.Ct.App. 1987)

2, 14

Morris v. Mountain States Tel.& Tel. Co.. 658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1983)

2, 14

Robert Laneston. Ltd. v. McOuarrie. 741 P.2d 554 (Ut. Ct. App., 1987)

2, 14

Ted R. Brown and Associates v. Cames Corp. 753 P.2d 964 (Ut. Ct. App 1988) . . 3, 16
Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715 (Utah, 1982)
White v. Fox. 665 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1983)

1, 8, 11
3, 16

RULES
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 56(f)

13

ii

STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended):
§25-5-1
§78-2-2

3, 16
1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Const, of Utah. Art. I, § 11

8

iii

BRIEF STATEMENT RE APPELLATE JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final decision in a civil matter arising from the
Third District Court, Summit County. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to S78-2-2. Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) [hereinafter referred to as
"UCA"].
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Summary Judgment Improperly Granted-Material Facts in Dispute
In an appeal from a Summary Judgment, the appellate court should not

defer to the trial court's ruling. First American Commerce v. Washington. 743 P.2d
1193 (Utah 1987).
The appellate Courts in Utah are to review the facts and the inferences
therefrom to be drawn in the light that most favors the losing party and affirm only if it
appears that there is no genuine dispute as to any material facts. Ehlers & Ehlers
Architects, v. Carbon County. 805 P.2d 789 (Ct. of App. 1991); Utah State Univ. v.
Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715 (Utah, 1982); Gadd v. Olson. 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah, 1984).
In this case there are material factual issues that are in dispute.
B.

Summary Judgment Improperly Granted-No Mutual Mistake
The trial judge ruled that "the obligations and duties of the parties never

came into existence", which appears to be based upon a "mutual mistake of fact" theory.
A mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of the contracting, share
misconceptions about basic assumptions or facts which they based their agreement upon.
Robert Langston. Ltd. v. McOuarrie. 741 P.2d 554 (Ut. Ct. App., 1987); Mooney v. GR
1

& Associates. 746 P.2d 1174 (Ut.Ct.App. 1987). In this case there are material factual
issues in dispute that preclude the entry of summary judgment based upon a mutual
mistake.
C.

Summary Judgment Improperly Granted-Discovery Not Completed
The general rule in Utah is that "summary judgment should not be granted

if discovery is incomplete since information sought in discovery may create issues of
material fact sufficient to defeat the motion." Callioux v. Progressive Insurance Co.. 745
P.2d 838, 840 (Ut.Ct.App. 1987). In this case there are material factual issues which
have not been the subject of discovery requests, and that should preclude the entry of
summary judgment.
D.

Summary Judgment Improperly Granted-Contract Not Integrated or
Unambiguous
Before the interpretation of a contract becomes a question of law, the

contract must be integrated and it must be unambiguous. Draughton v. CUNA Mutual
Insurance Society. 771 P.2d 1105 (Utah App. 1989). When the language of the contract
is ambiguous, the matter should be resolved by the taking of evidence. Morris v.
Mountain States Tel.& Tel. Co.. 658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1983). In addition, under the
"doctrine of practical construction", the post-contract conduct of the parties which
conflicts with the requirements of the contract may create the kind of ambiguity that will
bring that doctrine into effect. Bullough v. Sims. 400 P.2d 20 (Utah 1965). Since the
contract was ambiguous, the trial court should not have interpreted it as a matter of law.
Therefore, the case should be remanded for a trial.
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E.

Summary Judgment Improperly Granted-Waiver of Specific Financing
The parties to a contract can expressly or implicitly waive performance

violations in a contract. Johnson v. E.V. Cox Const. Co.. 620 P.2d 917, (Okla. App.
1980). Summary judgment was not proper because of this waiver by the Defendants.
F.

Summary Judgment Improperly Granted-Oral Amendments to Contract
The trial judge determined that "the terms of the written contract" are not

subject to change by way of a post-execution oral agreement". The law in Utah is that
any party to a contract may, by mutual consent, modify any contract and the terms of
the amendment will prevail over those of the original agreement. Ted R. Brown and
Associates v. Carnes Corp. 753 P.2d 964 (Ut. Ct. App 1988). The written contract met
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds [§25-5-1 UCAj. Oral amendments to such a
contract are enforceable if a party has changed his position in reliance thereon. White
v. Fox. 665 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1983). Since such changes complied with the Statute of
Frauds, then all of these changes are made part of the agreement as a whole. Allen v.
Kingdom 723 P. 2d 394 (Utah 1986).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action [hereinafter referred to as "the Litigation"] was brought [in
September, 1990] by Paul and Merridee Fair, husband and wife, and residents of the
state of Utah [hereinafter sometimes referred to jointly as the "Plaintiffs" or as the
"Farrs"]. The Fairs instituted the Litigation against Pam and Bryce Royle [hereinafter
sometimes referred to jointly as the "Defendants" or as the "Royles"] for, among other
things, specific performance of the Earnest Money Agreement between the parties,
dated July 24, 1990 [hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "Earnest Money
3

Agreement"], and for the issuance of a preliminary injunction to stay the Royles from
purchasing another home on a subsequent offer made by them.
The trial court ruled against the Plaintiffs' request for an injunction,
because the Judge ruled that the Farrs had an adequate remedy at law [money
damages]. [R.58]. Thereafter, the Farrs had the Complaint amended to include a cause
of action for breach of contract. [R. 166 - 191]. Before any discovery was initiated by
either party, the Royles filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which was granted.
Material Facts
If the Court assumes that Plaintiffs facts are true [for purposes of summary
judgment], and if they are interpreted and all inferences are drawn in the light most
favorable for the Plaintiffs, then it is true that:
On July 24, 1990, the Royles met with the Farrs at the Fairs' home for the
purpose of getting their offer written into an earnest money agreement. [R. 143-148]. At
this meeting, which was fairly short, the Royles stated that they both worked for Delta
Airlines [she was the manager of the Delta Employees' Credit Union ["DECU"]] and
that they planned to apply for a 95% LTV [loan to value] loan from DECU for their
purchase. Id. They did not tell the Farrs that this was the only kind of financing that
was acceptable to them or that they wanted to be able to have their mortgage payments
taken out of their wages by their employer. Id.
After this discussion, Mr. Fair wrote the terms of the agreement into a
standard form earnest money agreement and it was reviewed and signed by all of the
parties present. Id. On item 2 at the bottom of the first page, he wrote in the
information as to the type of financing for which the Royles would initially be applying.

4

Id. Since the offer was subject to the sale of the Royles' North Salt Lake home, no
definite date was set for the closing on this purchase. Id.
If the Royles had proposed that a 95% LTV loan from DECU was the
only type of financing that was acceptable to them, it would have been rejected by the
Farrs because it would indicate that the Royles were not strong buyers or that they were
not committed to the Farr's home. Id. The Earnest Money Agreement related to the
sale of the Farrs' home [135 Woodland Place, Summit Park, Utah, hereinafter "Fairs'
Home"] for $125,000. [R. 98-124 and Exhibit B, attached thereto].
Within about a week or so after the Farrs signed the Earnest Money
Agreement with the Royles the Farrs made an offer on a home in Summit Park on
Matterhorn Drive ["the Matterhorn house"], which offer was made subject to the Farrs
selling of their home. [R. 143-148].
Shortly after the signing of the Agreement, Mrs. Farr had a phone
discussion with Mrs. Royle during which it was agreed that the Fairs could put an
exception in the Agreement for the downstairs window coverings. Id. After Mrs. Fanadvised her husband of this discussion, he added such an exception for the downstairs
window coverings to the original Earnest Money. Id.
Prior to making that change to the Agreement, Mr. Farr had noticed that
he had forgotten to have the parties initial the document at the bottom [as the form
directs]. Id. A few days after the discussion relating to the window covering exception,
a meeting was set up between Mrs. Farr and the Royles at the home of DeWayne
Hansen [the Farrs' realtor on the offer they made on the Matterhorn home] in order to
add the Royles' initials to the Agreement. Id.
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At that time [about August 13, 1990], the Royles told Mrs. Farr and Mr.
Hansen that they could not get a 95% LTV loan from DECU. Id. The Royles further
said they would go ahead and apply for a 90% LTV loan from DECU, they did not
anticipate that they would have any problems in obtaining this financing, and they would
proceed to complete their agreed purchase of the Farrs' home. Id. Mrs. Farr agreed
with them that they should make this application and proceed with the completion of
their purchase of said home. Id.
At this meeting the Royles proposed two changes to the agreement
between the parties. Id. They wanted to have a specific closing date added to the
Agreement and they suggested that perhaps the language in the Agreement should be
changed to reflect that they were going to apply for a 90% LTV loan. Id. After some
discussion, the Royles agreed with the Farrs on a closing date of September 12, 1990.
Id. Mr. Hansen then wrote this language [12 Sept 90] into the original Agreement.

Id.

On the Royles' suggestion to change the language regarding the specific
financing, Mr. Hansen said that it was not necessary to make that change because it was
their obligation to find financing, and the particular type of financing was not important.
Id. The Royles then reviewed the Agreement, as it had been modified, and placed their
initials at the bottom of the form. Id. The Farrs had previously initialed the
Agreement. Id. The Royles were given the original of the Agreement at that meeting
to take to the DECU. Id. However, shortly thereafter, the Royles decided to buy a
different house in Summit [same price, $125,000, except with a 90% LTV from the
DECU] and they took no further steps to try and obtain financing for the purchase of
the Farrs' home. Id. and [R. 273].

6

The FHA will loan money on Summit County homes of up to $125,000
and the amount down is less than 5%, and such financing is assumable, unlike that of
the DECU. M.
At the time the Farrs signed the Earnest Money Agreement with the
Royles they understood the phrase "subject to Buyer qualifying for financing" to mean
the Buyer making an application for a type of financing that is available in the area. At
that same time, they understood the phrase "voidable at the option of the Seller" to
mean that they had the option, acting in good faith, to have the Royles seek alternate
types of financing if the type written on the Agreement fell through. Id.
On August 18, 1990, the Royles sent Plaintiff a letter wherein they stated
that the DECU would not make a 95% loan in Utah and they unilaterally declared the
Earnest money Agreement to be void. [R. 98-124 and Exhibit D, attached thereto].
On August 22, 1991, the Royles made an offer on another Summit Park
property with the same general terms as the offer they made on the Farrs' Home [same
price, same terms, except a 90% DECU LTV loan] which offer was subsequently
accepted. [R. 98-124 and Exhibit E, attached thereto] and R. 273, pg. 12, 16-18].
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The lower court improperly prevented the Plaintiffs from conducting
discovery and preparing there case for trial when it granted the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment because:

1.

There are material factual disputes in this case which need to be

resolved at a trial.
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2.

There are material factual disputes in this case and no discovery has

been done. Therefore, this case should be reversed and remanded so the parties may
conduct discovery and prepare their cases for trial.
3.

There are material factual disputes in this case and there was no

evidence before the trial court to support a "mutual mistake" theory.
4.

There are material factual disputes in this case and the Earnest

Money Agreement at issue was not integrated or unambiguous.
5.

There are material factual disputes in this case and the Royles had

waived their right to enforce the Earnest Money Agreement provision which required
that they only seek a 95% LTV loan from the DECU.
6.

There are material factual disputes in this case and the Earnest

Money Agreement at issue had been amended by the parties so that the Royles agreed
to seek a 90% loan to complete their purchase of the Farrs' Home
ARGUMENT
Petitioner asserts the following points of law in support hereof:
I.

UTAH LAW REGARDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT - MATERIAL FACTS
IN DISPUTE
In Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715 (Utah, 1982), the

Supreme Court outlined its concerns against the granting of a summary judgment, noting
that in light of the Utah constitutional guarantee fConst, of Utah. Art. I, § 11] of access
to the courts for redress of wrongs:
[S]ummary judgment, which denies the opportunity of trial,
should only be granted when it clearly appears that there is
8

no reasonable probability that the party moved against can
prevail. IcL, at 720.
With regard to the grant of summary judgments generally, the standard to
be applied under Utah law is:
A motion for summary judgment can only be granted when
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and even
assuming the facts asserted by the party moved against to be
true, he could not prevail . . . .
Since the party moved against is denied the opportunity of
presenting his evidence and his contentions, it should be and
is the policy of the courts to act on such motions with great
caution, to assure that a party whose cause might have merit
is not deprived of the right to access to the courts for the
enforcement of rights or the redress of wrongs. Gadd v.
Olson. 685 P.2d 1041, 1043 (Utah, 1984) (footnotes and
quotations omitted).
In applying this standard of review to the facts sub judice. we find that
there are many material facts in dispute as to the terms of the agreement of the parties
and the circumstances of this case, among other things. Since the Plaintiffs' facts are
assumed to be true for purposes of summary judgment, then the lower court erred in
granting Defendants' summary judgment motion.
Material Facts in Dispute
Among the material issues that are in dispute in this case, are the
following:
A.

Whether the parties agreed that a 95% LTV loan from DECU was the

only acceptable financing, which is what the lower court concluded?

However, if we

assume that Plaintiffs' facts are true, then the Farrs never agreed that a 95% LTV loan
from DECU was the only acceptable financing. Therefore, the Royles did not act
9

properly when they unilaterally declared the Agreement to be void when they could not
obtain such a 95% LTV loan. This is due, in part, to the fact that the Royles never
made any other effort to obtain financing to purchase the Fairs' home after being
advised that the 95% LTV was not available in Utah. As a result, they breached the
obligation to proceed in good faith under the contract. Ferris v. Jennings. 595 P.2d 857
(Utah 1979). They clearly could have sought such alternate financing [since they did
seek a 90% loan with the same principal amount from the DECU on their new
purchase], and because they could have applied for a 95 + % LTV loan from the FHA.
B.

Whether the Royles had the authority, as the Buyer, to declare the

Agreement void?

A key provision of the Earnest Money Agreement states that "[i]f

Buyer [Royles] is required to obtain outside financing [he] agrees to use his best efforts
to obtain the same . . . , [and if he ] does not qualify . . . within 30 days . . ., this
Agreement will be voidable at the option of the Seller [Farrs] upon written notice."
This language gives the Farrs the option to keep the Royles obligated under the
Agreement until financing alternatives can be explored. If we assume that Plaintiffs'
facts are true, then the Farrs understood the phrase "voidable at the option of the
Seller" to mean that they had the option, acting in good faith, to have the Royles seek
alternate types of financing if the type written on the Agreement fell through.
Therefore, the Royles acted in bad faith when they did not seek to obtain financing
other that the 95% LTV loan. This means that summary judgment was improperly
granted.
C.

Whether the parties had agreed to amend the Agreement so that they

could apply for a 90% TV loan from the DECU? Even if the parties had originally
agreed that the 95% LTV loan was essential, this provision was either amended to a
10

90% loan [as was agreed by the parties at the meeting to initial the Agreement] or its
strict enforcement was waived by the Royles' assertion [at said meeting] that they would
proceed to apply for a 90% loan in order to complete their purchase of the Farrs' home.
If we assume that Plaintiffs' facts are true, then the Royles agreed to change the type of
loan for which they would apply or they waived their right to strict performance of the
original provision. However, since the Royles did not seek to obtain said 90% LTV
loan from the DECU, they breached their good faith obligation under the Agreement
and summary judgment was improperly granted for Defendants.
Moreover, since the price on the new home which the Royles sought to
purchase was the same as the Farrs [$125,000],and since the Royles have been
approved for a 90% LTV mortgage to purchase this new home, then it is apparent that,
acting in good faith, the Royles could have obtained the same loan to complete their
purchase of the Fairs' Home. Four days after the Royles wrote the letter to declare the
Agreement void, they signed a contract for the new home.
In an appeal from a Summary Judgment, the appellate court should not
defer to the trial court's ruling. First American Commerce v. Washington. 743 P.2d
1193 (Utah 1987).
The appellate courts in Utah are to review the facts and the inferences
therefrom to be drawn in the light that most favors the losing party and affirm only if it
appears that there is no genuine dispute as to any material facts. Ehlers & Ehlers
Architects, v. Carbon County. 805 P.2d 789 (Ct. of App. 1991); Utah State Univ. v.
Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715 (Utah, 1982); Gadd v. Olson. 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah, 1984).
In this case there are material factual issues that are in dispute that preclude the
summary disposition of this case.
11

H.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT PROPER BECAUSE DISCOVERY IS NOT
COMPLETED

The general rule in Utah is that "summary judgment should not be granted
if discovery is incomplete since information sought in discovery may create issues of
material fact sufficient to defeat the motion." Callioux v. Progressive Insurance Co.. 745
P.2d 838, 840 (Ut.Ct.App.1987). Since discovery and investigation are not complete in
this case, then summary judgment was improperly considered by the lower court. Id.
There are numerous issues before the Court that are unresolved at this
stage in the proceeding, for example:
1.

Did Defendants timely file and pursue in good faith their

obligations under the Earnest Money Agreement?
2.

Why was Defendants' application for financing turned down?

3.

Did the Defendants waive whatever rights they may have had to

rely on the 95% LTV loan from DECU as the only source of financing, by reason of
their post-Agreement actions or discussions?
4.

Are Defendants estopped to assert a breach of the Agreement,

based on the 95% LTV loan from DECU language, by reason of their post-Agreement
actions or discussions?
5.

Did the Defendants agree to amend the language in the Agreement

[to whatever extent it is applicable] to require only a 90% LTV loan from DECU as the
source of financing, by reason of their post-Agreement actions or discussions?
6.

Did the Royles have the authority, as the Buyer, to declare the

Agreement void?
12

The general rule in Utah is that "summary judgment should not be granted
if discovery is incomplete since information sought in discovery may create issues of
material fact sufficient to defeat the motion." Callioux v. Progressive Insurance Co.. 745
P.2d 838, 840 (Ut.Ct.App.1987). This case was so "fresh" that discovery and investigation
had barely begun and there were numerous material facts where discovery was much
needed by the parties before the case should have been subject to a summary judgment
motion.
As can be seen from the Rule 56(f) Affidavit filed by Plaintiffs in
opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 149 - 153] these are all factual
areas where Plaintiffs have not had an opportunity to explore in this case.
The trial court misapplied the law in this case and its ruling should be
reversed.
m.

UTAH LAW REGARDING MUTUAL MISTAKE
The trial judge ruled [R. 226 - 228] that "the obligations and duties of the

parties never came into existence" due to the fact that (a) the DECU had no 95% loans
available in Utah and (b) this was the only kind of financing acceptable to the parties.
This language, and the recessional nature of the award, appears to be based upon a
"mutual mistake of fact" theory. A mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the time
of the contracting, share misconceptions about basic assumptions or facts which they
based their agreement upon. Robert Langston. Ltd. v. McOuarrie. 741 P.2d 554 (Ut. Ct.
App., 1987); Mooney v. GR & Associates. 746 P.2d 1174 (Ut.Ct.App. 1987). In this
case there are material facts in dispute that preclude the entry of summary judgment
based upon a mutual mistake. The most significant of which is the fact that [assuming
the Farrs' facts to be true] they never agreed that a 95% LTV loan from the DECU was
13

the only type of financing for which the Royles had to apply. Therefore, there was no
undisputed material facts which supported a mutual mistake of fact theory and the trial
court's ruling was incorrect.
IV.

UTAH LAW REGARDING CONTRACT NOT INTEGRATED OR
AMBIGUOUS
Before the interpretation of a contract becomes a question of law, the

contract must be integrated and it must be unambiguous. Draughton v. CUNA Mutual
Insurance Society. 771 P.2d 1105 (Utah App. 1989). There was no evidence before the
trial court that the parties considered any particular contract to be a final statement of
all of the terms of their agreement. Since there were no such facts presented, then the
lower court should not have concluded that the Agreement was integrated. If the
Agreement was not integrated, then summary judgment should be reversed.
Even assuming arguendo that there was an integrated Agreement, Plaintiff
is still entitled to a reversal of the summary judgment motion because the Agreement is
ambiguous. When the language of the contract is ambiguous, then the matter should be
resolved by the taking of evidence. Morris v. Mountain States Tel.& Tel. Co.. 658 P.2d
1199 (Utah 1983). Both sides have advanced rational interpretations of what the key
provisions of the Agreement should mean [e.g., (a) whether the 95% LTV loan from the
DECU was the only type of financing for which the Royles had to apply, (b) whether the
Defendants met their obligations under the Earnest Money Agreement in good faith, (c)
what the phrase "subject to Buyer qualifying for financing" was intended to mean, (d)
what the phrase "voidable at the option of the Seller" was to mean]. Therefore, the
contract was ambiguous and should not have been interpreted as a matter of law by the
trial court. Therefore, the case should be remanded for a trial.
14

Moreover, under the "doctrine of practical construction", the post-contract
conduct of the Royles and the Farrs which conflicts with the requirements of the
Agreement may create the kind of ambiguity that will bring that doctrine into effect.
Bullough v. Sims. 400 P.2d 20 (Utah 1965). Assuming Plaintiffs' facts to be true, the
Royles indicated that, even though they could not obtain a 95% loan from the DECU,
they would still seek a 90% DECU loan in order to complete their purchase of the
Farrs' Home.

This action of the Royles flies in the face of an interpretation that a 95%

loan was essential. Therefore, even if the Agreement appeared unambiguous on its face,
the matter lower court's decision should be reversed due to the application of the
practical construction doctrine.
V.

UTAH LAW REGARDING WAIVER OF CONTRACT PROVISION
The parties to a contract can expressly or implicitly waive any required

performance.

Johnson v. E.V. Cox Const. Co.. 620 P.2d 917. (Okla. App. 1980).

Plaintiffs' evidence shows that Defendants agreed that they would proceed to obtain a
90% LTV DECU to purchase the Fairs' Home, when they found the 95% loan was
unavailable. Assuming arguendo that the trial court correctly determined that a 95 %
loan was all that was required by the contract, since Plaintiffs' evidence viewed most
favorably for them shows that the Defendants waived the specific enforcement of that
provision by agreeing instead to obtain a 90% loan for that purpose [and the Farrs, in
return, agreed to a specific closing date at the Royles' request]. Thus, the summary
judgment was not proper because of this waiver by the Defendants.
VI.

UTAH LAW REGARDING AMENDMENTS TO CONTRACTS
The trial judge determined that "the terms of the written contract" are not

subject to change by way of a post-execution oral agreement. The law in Utah is that
15

any party to a contract may, by mutual consent, modify any contract and the terms of
the amendment will prevail over those of the original agreement. Ted R. Brown and
Associates v. Carnes Corp. 753 P.2d 964 (Ut. Ct. App 1988). The written Agreement in
this case clearly meets the requirements of the Statute of Frauds [§25-5-1 UCA]. Oral
amendments to a contract that is required to be in writing in order to comply with the
Statute of Frauds are enforceable if a party has changed his position in reliance thereon.
White v. Fox. 665 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1983). In this case, the Farrs agreed to a specific
closing date and continued to keep their Home off the real estate market in exchange
for the Royles agreement to apply for a 90% LTV from the DECU. Therefore, this oral
understanding meets the test under White and modifies the terms of the Agreement
When such changes comply with the Statute of Frauds, then all of these
changes are made part of the agreement as a whole. Allen v. Kingdon. 723 P. 2d 394
(Utah 1986). In addition, since part of this understanding was memorialized on the
Agreement itself [change in closing date], and the Royles initialed the same thereafter,
then such change complied with the statute of frauds.

16

CONCLUSION
The lower court improperly prevented the Plaintiffs from conducting
discovery and preparing there case for trial when it granted the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. Since there are material factual disputes in this case, then the
lower court's ruling should be reversed.
DATED this/ day of September, 1991.
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR
& ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for PJaJnTfrTs~-Ar)pellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Alan Stewart
4885 South 900 East
Suite 306
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
.*&

this day of September, 1991.
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ALAN R. STEWART
(4 920)
POOLE & VOROS, P.O.
Attorneys for Defendants Royle
4885 South 900 East, Suite 306
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone (801) 263-3 344
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR and
MERRIDEE FARR,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
VS.
CIVIL NO. 10799
BRYCE WILLIAM ROYLE, PAMELA
ROYLE, DAN ZIEHM, and TOM
HAYCOCK, dba FIRESIDE REAL
ESTATE,
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL
Defendants,

Defendants', Bryce William Royle and Pamela Roy]e (hereinafter referred to as "Royles"), Motion for Summary Judgment having
come before the Court for decision pursuant to the provisions of
Rule-

4-501

of

the Utah

Rules

of

Judicial Administration,

the

Course having reviewed Royles Memorandum and Affidavits filed in
support of

their Motion, and the Plaintiffs 1

response thereto,

the Court being fully advised in the premises, and the Court having issued its decision per Minute Entry dated January 24, 1991,
now,

therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

against

Defendants Royles are hereby awarded Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs

on

their

Counterclaim

B00K.KKPACE3 5 1

for

return

of

their

earnest money deposit in the amount of $1,000.00, together with
interest thereon at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from
August 18, 1990, until the date of entry of this judgment in the
sum of $46.85, for a total judgment of $1,046.85, said judgment
to bear

interest at the rate of twelve percent

(12%) per annum

from the date hereof until paid,
2.

Plaintiffs'

claims

against

Defendants Royles be, and

the same are hereby, dismissed with prejudice,
3.
av/ard of

The Court rules that neither party
attorney's

fees

is entitled to an

inasmuch as there was a failure of a

condition precedent, and as a result thereof there was no agreement between the parties and there has been no default.
JUDGMENT DATED this - / "^_ day of February, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

FRANK G. NOEL,
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORI::

PAUL FRANKLIN FARR
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No.
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was

mailed,
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follow-
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Paul Franklin Farr, Esq*
Paul Franklin Farr & Associates, P.C.
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Busch Forum, Suite 540
5295 South 320 West
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